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Abstract  
In 1996 and 2005, two of the largest E.coli O157 outbreaks occurred in the UK. 
Many people were infected after consuming meat resulting in a number of deaths. In 
the present study we applied a systems approach to both the outbreak reports to 
analyse and compare the accidents. Using the Accimap method of systems analysis, 
this study investigates the human errors and organisational issues involved in the 
outbreaks and why accidents such as these occur in the food production domain. 
The systems analysis carried out in this study on the two outbreaks indicates that 
there are both common as well as unique factors associated with the two outbreaks. 
The study concludes that it is necessary to address food safety and look at the food 
industry as a whole, identify and solve the various problems that could arise in the 
system, pre-incubation period, before the outbreak actually occurs. 
 
Key words: Systems thinking; accident analysis; Pennington Report; Accimap; Food 
Safety Culture; Human factors 
Highlights  
 In the past, food related outbreaks were almost always looked at from a 
microbiological point of view and were dealt with by trying to prevent 
pathogenic microbes from contaminating food. 
 This study suggests that food manufacturing industries are complex socio-
technical systems and outbreaks are caused due to various human factors 
across various systemic levels and in order to prevent future outbreaks the 
issues across the various systemic levels must be addressed. 
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1. Introduction – food safety and infection outbreaks 
    Poor understanding of the importance of food safety and hygiene has in the past 
contributed to a number of food poisoning outbreaks and at times, deaths (e.g. 1996 
E.coli O157 Outbreak in Scotland, 2005 E.coli O157 Outbreak in Wales and the 
Walkerton E.coli Outbreak in Canada in 2000). Reports and studies carried out on 
these outbreaks identified a wide range of factors contributing to these accidents. 
Chief amongst these were the relaxed attitudes towards food safety, lack of 
adequate training provision and many other such human factors related errors.  The 
1996 and 2005 E.coli O157 outbreaks in the UK for example, are often seen as 
indicative of poor regard for hygiene and safety standards amongst food business 
operators (Royal Society for Public Health, 2013). The 1996 Outbreak resulted in 
496 cases of E.coli O157 infection and 18 deaths, whilst the 2005 Outbreak resulted 
in 1 death and 157 cases. The 2009 Godstone Farm E.coli O157 outbreak is seen as 
a substantial failure of health protection and the flaws of a complex regulatory 
structure were identified as a major contributing factor (Griffin et al., 2010). This 
outbreak resulted in 93 cases, most of whom were children. 
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    Between 1986 and 1996, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) entered the 
human and animal food supply despite the best efforts of regulators (Cassano-Piché 
et al., 2006). BSE causes a fatal disease in humans called variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob 
Disease (vCJD). Although 160,000 cows were slaughtered between 1986 and 1996 
due to the risks of BSE , it claimed the lives of 150 people and more than 3 million 
cows in the UK as of 2006 (Ansell and Vogel, 2006; Cassano-Piché et al., 2006). 
According to Cassano-Piche et al. (2009), apart from the tragic loss of human and 
animal lives, it also had massive economic consequences. The association of vCJD 
with BSE led to loss of exports and reduced domestic demand for British beef within 
twelve months which amounted to a total loss of £1.15 billion. This case illustrates 
the dilemmas involved between science and regulation, market promotion and 
consumer protection, public authority and public opinion and resulted in a public 
policy public relations fiasco. The BSE case highlighted the failures of the then 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) (Ansell and Vogel, 2006), which 
since 2002 has been merged into the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). Finally, the Walkerton E.coli Outbreak in Canada (May, 2000) is 
another example of food poisoning due to water contamination which led to seven 
deaths and 2300 illnesses. Despite the authorities’ efforts in developing control 
measures and regulations, food safety remains a complex public health issue 
(Faour-Klingbeil et al., 2015). Factors such as faulty inspections, poor management 
of facilities, falsified records and inadequate staff training led to production of 
contaminated food. All of these factors have been implicated in outbreak inquiries. 
Outbreaks are “not simply an anomalous event limited to one point in time and place, 
but the emergent product of an extended set of processes that evolved over time 
and through different scales of involvement at the political-economic, social and 
biophysical levels" (Ali, 2004). 
1.1. Food safety – a systems approach 
    A range of factors and stakeholders play a role in providing food which is safe for 
consumption. These include regulators, transportation, the appropriate use of 
chemicals and pesticides, microbial growth conditions, food safety management 
systems in food businesses and storage conditions in supermarkets and stores. In 
his book “When Food Kills: BSE, E.coli and disaster science” (2003), Hugh 
Pennington suggested that it was important to take the human factor aspect into 
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account while analysing outbreaks. He uses the concept of a systems based 
approach in this book to analyse and compare food poisoning outbreaks to the Piper 
Alpha, Chernobyl and the railway accidents in Ireland and Britain. A similar emphasis 
on the need for food science to go beyond the microbiological approach and look at 
the human factors involved in the accidents has also been pointed out by Griffith et 
al. (2010). According to Clayton and Griffith (2008) a number of studies indicate that 
although disregard for hygiene practices is sometimes due to negligence by the 
individual, it is often related to the prevailing organisational culture (Griffith et al., 
2010) within the food industry. In this case it is important to realize the importance of 
trust (Burns et al., 2006) between the individual (workers, customers) and the 
organization (Schlosser, 2001) as this will influence safety in food production areas. 
    The sequences of events which led to the outbreaks reveal a complex interaction 
among the levels in a complex socio-technical system, which included the work 
environment, staff, management, company, regulators and government (Pennington 
et al., 2009; The Pennington Group, 1997; Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006). Apart 
from the lack of “vertical interaction” (Kirlik, 2011) Pennington also pointed out that 
misunderstandings and lack of communication between people are a recurrent 
theme in the incubation periods of disasters (Piper Alpha, Croydon Well and the 
1996 E.coli O157 outbreak). A combination of the volatility of the economic climate 
as well as lack of regard for hygiene practices, accurate documentation and 
reporting led to these events; in short, there were flaws in the entire socio-technical 
system. Similarly, non-compliance with food safety management requirements has 
also been shown to be problematic. In his book “Fast Food Nation” (2001), Eric 
Schlosser highlights the amount of pressure put on meat industry workers; he states 
that there are hundreds of workers, pressed together, constantly moving and slicing, 
afraid of falling behind. The abattoir he visited was so cramped up and hectic that 
women workers were sweating although it was air conditioned. Such conditions lead 
to injuries to workers and injured workers impact the business due to economic 
consequences; hence these workers are unsubtly asked to quit by giving them the 
most unpleasant tasks in the slaughterhouse (Schlosser, 2011). This kind of 
organisational behaviour and culture leads to a negative culture in a food business. 
    A negligent organisational safety culture also affects the behaviour of people from 
the top right down to temporary staff (Royal Society for Public Health, 2013). The 
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concept of organisational safety culture though largely unexplored in the food 
industry, is well established within other industries such as nuclear, aviation, oil and 
gas, rail transportation and healthcare (Antonsen, 2009; Cheyne and Cox, 2000; 
Griffith et al., 2010, Waterson, 2014). The 2009 report recommends that food 
businesses must be able to ensure food safety at all levels in their operation by 
making sure that the importance of food safety management is embedded in their 
working culture and practice (Pennington et al., 2009). 
 
1.2. Regulation and inspection of the Food industry in the UK 
    Prior to discussing the outbreaks in detail, it is important to understand how an 
ideal food business is required to operate as per Food Standards Agency. Table 1 
highlights the key functions of Environmental Health Officers in the UK. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The Food Standards Agency has provided a detailed guidance to people who wish to 
operate a food business. The main areas a food business proprietor should focus on 
are (1) good food hygiene, (2) following the hygiene rules, (3) having a well-
documented system in place such as Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) and (4) providing training to all employees. Good food hygiene includes 
the so-called four Cs: cross contamination, cooking, chilling and cleaning. It is the 
duty of the food business to ensure that there is no cross-contamination, especially 
the food industries that handle meat (cooked and raw) as these are high risk 
industries. Adequate amount of cooking and/or chilling of food must be provided for 
by the business in order to prevent growth of microorganisms. Cleaning of the 
premises as well as the equipment used must be carried out regularly. The FSA has 
also made it mandatory for food businesses to use disinfectants that meet the British 
European (BS EN) standards. Either one of BS EN 1276 or BS EN 13697 must be 
present on the disinfectants. Staff training includes HACCP, instruction/training in 
food hygiene as well as general hygiene training such as techniques for effective 
hand washing. If the food business intends to sell alcohol, hot food and drink late at 
night or food on the street, it must acquire a license. 
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    Food inspectors are environmental health officers from the local authority. The 
main purposes of their inspections are to make sure that the food is safe to eat and 
that the descriptions (labels) are not misleading. The inspectors inspect the premises, 
foods prepared, method of working and the food safety management system. They 
make sure that the business complies with the regulations. During the inspection 
visits, they follow the Food Standards Agency’s Framework Agreement on local 
authority food enforcement and the Food Law Code of Practice. The Feed and Food 
Law Codes provides the enforcers flexibility over how to deliver official food controls. 
It is the duty of the inspectors to provide feedback on an inspection and advice on 
how identified problems could be avoided. They also have to specify whether the 
advised action is needed in order to comply with the law or whether it is good 
practice. The inspectors also have the authority to inspect records, take samples and 
photographs of food, write informally in order to put right any problems (if they are 
not major risks), detain or seize suspected foods or serve notices. Notices are of 
three types: (1) hygiene improvement notice, (2) hygiene emergency prohibition 
notice and (3) remedial action notice. The first one sets out actions that must be 
taken to comply with the law; the second one forbids the use of certain processes, 
premises or equipment but must be confirmed by a court, while the third one forbids 
the use of processes, premises or equipment, or imposes conditions on how a 
process is carried out, however it does not need to be confirmed by a court. Failure 
to comply with any of these notices is a criminal offence. In the event of a serious 
case inspectors can also recommend prosecution (Food Standards Agency, 2015; 
Hutter and Amodu, 2008).  
    However, according to Ansell and Vogel (2006), the European food safety 
regulations have a considerable amount of flaws. Although food safety is an 
important and a highly salient regulatory arena, it has been brought into sharp relief 
in contemporary Europe. European consumers are sensitive to food safety policies 
due to a series of food-related scares and disputes such as mad cow disease, dioxin 
contamination, beef hormones, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and the 
recent horse meat scandal. These changes in policy coincide with two major 
institutional changes: (1) European integration and (2) international trade 
liberalization. Multi-level regulations, core disputes about risk assessment and 
regulatory science and the shifting balance between public and private regulation are 
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among a list of various topics in which flaws in the European food policy might be 
said to be evident. 
 
1.3. Study aims and objectives 
    The overall aim of the paper is to analyse the E.coli O157 outbreaks of 1996 and 
2005, and explore further the role played by human factors in contributing to these 
accidents. In order to achieve this, the study has three main objectives: 
1. To apply a systems approach to the 1996 and 2005 outbreak reports and use the 
Accimap method of systems analysis to analyse human and organisational issues 
involved in the outbreaks; 
2. To reflect on the similarities and differences in terms of human and organisational 
factors that led up to these outbreaks and shed further light on countermeasures and 
ways forward to improve food and organisational safety culture in food businesses.  
 
2. Methods of study 
    The Accimap approach was used to analyse both outbreaks. This involved the 
construction of a multi-layered graphical representation in which the causes of the 
accidents were arranged according to their causal remoteness from the outcome 
(Branford et al., 2009). 
2.1. The Accimap method 
    Accimaps adopt a control theory-based systems approach to accident analysis 
and were first developed by Rasmussen (1997) and Svedung and Rasmussen 
(2002). Accidents are the result of unexpected, uncontrolled relationships between a 
system’s constituent parts where the systems are analysed as whole entities instead 
of considering them as various parts in isolation (Underwood and Waterson, 2014). 
The dynamic nature of socio-technical systems means that an accident is likely to 
develop over time by the normal efforts of various individuals in a system and a 
normal variation in somebody’s behaviour. This variation in behaviour can ‘release’ 
an accident (Rasmussen, 1997). 
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    The Accimap is a graph that represents a particular accident scenario (Svedung 
and Rasmussen, 2002). It represents the causal flow of events at various systemic 
levels such as management, regulating bodies and individual/physical processes. It 
was developed as a means of analysing the series of events and decision making 
processes which would have occurred throughout the socio-technical system and 
resulted in a loss of control (Branford et al., 2009). Rasmussen emphasized that all 
work situations leave many degrees of freedom to the actors in a system. They have 
the ability to choose the means and times of action even when there is a set of 
instructions or a set of standard operating procedures in place to follow (Rasmussen, 
1997). Industries have rules and protocols in place for every task in order to achieve 
maximum efficiency; however failure to realize that several inter-related tasks occur 
at the same time often leads to accidents. Rules, laws and instructions are never 
followed to the letter. The Accimap model depicts the control of socio-technical 
systems over six basic organisational levels: 
 Government level: Laws and legislation developed to control the hazardous 
procedures 
 Regulatory bodies and associations: Where the legislation is converted into 
industry rules and regulations 
 Company level: Where the rules and regulations are integrated into the 
company rules and policies 
 Management level: Where the staff activities and roles are specified and 
overseen with reference to the company level rules and policies 
 Staff level: The work force that follows the rules set about by their managers. 
 Equipment and surroundings: Where the company’s rules and policies apply 
based on the government level regulations 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
    The Accimap has been used to analyse individual accidents such as the 
Überlingen mid-air collision (Branford, 2011), the railway crash at Kerang (Salmon et 
al., 2013) and the Black Hawk Friendly Fire Shoot Down (Harvey and Stanton, 2014) 
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and is used as a guide or template to help organize the research endeavour in a 
systematic fashion. Safety not only depends on the individuals who interact with 
hazardous processes on a daily basis, but also on the activities of individuals at 
every level in the system and the quality of interaction between these levels. This is 
the basis of the Accimap approach which due to its graphical representation helps 
identify the causal factors behind an accident and the events that led to it. Due to 
external influences such as political, financial and technological factors, the levels 
are not stable and change constantly in order to adapt. Maintaining control is hence 
a dynamic process, involving the entire socio-technical system (Svedung & 
Rasmussen, 2002). 
     
2.2.  Procedure for analysing the outbreak reports 
The Accimap analyses of the outbreaks were performed by the first author. The 
analyses were then reviewed by the second author. While both individuals are 
human factors researchers, the first researcher has experience in food safety and 
food science and the second researcher has experience in applying human factors 
and accident analysis methods in various domains (e.g. rail, construction, aviation 
and healthcare). Upon completion of the analyses, the researchers exchanged and 
reviewed the outputs and any disagreements were resolved through discussion until 
consensus was reached in a similar manner to the approach described in 
Underwood and Waterson (2014).    
    Branford, Naikar and Hopkins developed (2009) a standardised Accimap 
approach which involves a set of guidelines that incorporate factors common to all 
the varieties of Accimap approaches. This format incorporates a set of guidelines for 
identifying the causal factors and illustrates how the causes led to the outcome. It 
also helps to promote the development of safety recommendations and can be used 
in multiple fields to analyse organisational accidents in a complex socio-technical 
system. A number of steps described by Branford et al. (2009) were followed for the 
analysis of each accident. A few changes were made to the types of factors in the 
Accimap diagrams. These are described in the form of direct, indirect and complex 
causes, pre-conditions and outcomes. Critical events, which if avoided, would have 
completely prevented the following outcome are categorized as “direct causes”. 
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Indirect causes are those causes which did not have a straightforward role to play in 
the next outcome. These are the causes which even if prevented, could not prevent 
the outcome, as there were other factors that also led to the same outcome. 
Preconditions are those events which either lead to a direct or an indirect cause, but 
are not causes themselves. The ‘complex cause’ concept is a novel concept as it 
indicates that a cause is direct as well as indirect and that it had multiple roles to play 
in the outbreak. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The Pennington reports on the 1997 and 2005 outbreaks were reviewed in detail, 
independently by both the authors and analyses of the following steps were carried 
out: (1) construction of a timeline of the events involved in the outbreaks; (2) 
contributory factors that led to the outbreak; (3) which of these were human factors; 
(4) systemic level in which the human factor was present. Table 2 describes in detail 
the coding used to construct the Accimap. The resulting Accimaps are presented in 
Figures 2 and 3, Tables 5 and 6 and discussed in detail in Section 5.  
 
3. The Outbreaks 
3.1. Events proximal to the 1996 E.coli O157 Outbreak 
    The Public Health Department of Lanarkshire (‘the Health Board’) identified the 
possibility of  a food poisoning outbreak caused by infection with E.coli O157 on 22nd 
November 1996 after they became aware of the many cases of infection in residents 
of Wishaw in the central belt of Scotland. On the same day, the Board notified the 
Environmental Services Department of North Lanarkshire Council (‘the Council) and 
arrangements were made to investigate and control the outbreak in accordance with 
the updated guidelines issued in 1996 by The Scottish Office Department of Health 
Advisory Group on Infection. On 23rd November 1996, an Outbreak Control Team 
(OCT) was formed. 
    Histories obtained from 9 out of the 15 cases by the evening of 22nd November 
1996 indicated that 8 out of 9 had consumed food obtained either directly from J. 
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Barr and Son butchers or at a church lunch which was served by the same butchers. 
Although it looked like a small butchers shop from the outside with a bakery attached, 
J. Barr and Son was involved in the production and distribution of raw and cooked 
meats and bakery products from the Wishaw premises and employed 40 people, 
most on a part-time basis. Mr Barr was visited by representatives of the Health 
Board and the Council on 22nd November 1996 and the entire business was closed 
voluntarily on 27th November 1996. Many factors led to the outbreak such as the 
absence of a documented system in order to keep note of all the outlets they 
supplied meat to and exemption from Meat Products Regulations 1994. 
    The Outbreak Control Team’s first meeting was on 23rd November 1996. Initially 
they met every day; however the frequency was reduced later on as the Outbreak 
was brought under control. The Scottish Office Department of Health (SODoH) and 
the Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) met with the 
Health Board and the Council on 26th November 1996 and a Food Hazard Warning 
was issued by the Scottish Office on the 27th. Further detailed guidance and advice 
was issued in the form of a further Food Hazard Warning on the 28th of November. 
On the same day, the Scottish Office attended the OCT meeting as observers and 
the Secretary of State for Scotland announced in Parliament the establishment of an 
Expert Group to examine the circumstances which led to the outbreak in the central 
belt of Scotland and to advice on the implications for food safety and the general 
lessons to be learned. This group was to be chaired by Professor Hugh Pennington. 
The OCT dealt with a range of matters mentioned in the guidelines and a few 
specific issues arose out of this. This helped the Group realized that the guidelines 
needed a reviewing too as there could be faults in them. The identification, 
management and control of the outbreak was managed very well due to enormous 
efforts, the ability to make difficult professional judgements and the availability of 
only a limited amount of resources. 
    After the outset of the outbreak the number of cases increased dramatically. It 
began as one probable case on November 9, 1996 and went as high as around 23 
confirmed and 16 possible cases on November 25, 1996. This was due to the fact 
that Barr distributed his products into the whole central belt of Scotland. Hence there 
were also cases from the Forth Valley, Lothian and Greater Glasgow. Due to the 
absence of a documented system to keep track of the places Barr distributed his 
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food products to, the OCT couldn’t assume that there was only one source of 
contaminated food. Both, epidemiological and microbial evidence show that the 
outbreak consisted of several separate but related cases (as shown in Table 3). The 
final date for the onset of illness was 15th December 1996 and the outbreak was 
declared as over on 20th January 1997, however the possibility of further cases due 
to secondary spread was recognized. Further deaths due to prolonged illness were 
also recognized. This is the largest ever outbreak of infection caused by E.coli O157 
in UK. 
    The scale of the outbreak placed the local health resources under substantial 
pressures. The Wishaw clinic in Lanarkshire carried out batches of tests on some 
969 people with diarrhoea, in addition to the number of people who attended their 
GP. 127 people were admitted to the hospital, out of which, 13 required dialysis on a 
daily basis. All these 13 people were transferred to Glasgow. 27 people were 
diagnosed with having haemolytic uremic syndrome. There were 18 deaths (all 
adults) due to the outbreak, which was the second highest number of deaths 
associated with an outbreak of E.coli O157 infection in the world at the time of writing 
the report. Of these 18, 8 had attended the luncheon served at Wishaw Old Parish 
Church on 17th November 1996 and 6 were residents of Bankview Nursing Home in 
Bonnybridge, Forth Valley. In Lanarkshire, the 12 people who died were of the ages 
between 69 and 90 years and in the Forth Valley, the range was between 70 and 93 
years. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
3.2. Events proximal to the 2005 E.coli 0157 outbreak 
    The September 2005 E.coli O157 outbreak in South Wales was the largest 
outbreak caused by a single microorganism in Wales, and the second largest in the 
UK. A total of 157 cases were identified, of which 118 were confirmed 
microbiologically as E.coli O157. 109 of these 118 were of a strain unique to the 
Outbreak. Children from 44 schools across four local authorities were infected; thirty 
one people were admitted to hospital and one died. The objectives of the inquiry 
were to investigate the circumstances that led up to the Outbreak of E.coli O157 
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infection in South Wales on September 2005 and into the handling of the Outbreak. 
Substantial amounts of oral and written evidence were collected. 
    Cooked meats contaminated with E.coli O157 were identified as the main cause of 
the Outbreak. Microbiological testing proved that the strains of E.coli O157 obtained 
from people infected were the same as those found on the cooked meats recovered 
from schools, in a sample of raw meat obtained from John Tudor & Son and in 
samples of cattle faeces taken from the farm (‘the Farm’). Cattle from the farm were 
slaughtered at J.E. Tudor & Sons Ltd, an abattoir owned by Tudor. The abattoir 
supplied meat to John Tudor & Son. Food hygiene failures, repeated breaches of the 
Food Safety Regulations, falsified records and an invalid Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) plan at the premises of John Tudor & Son led to the 
Outbreak; hence the responsibility fell on the shoulders of William Tudor, the 
Proprietor. He misled the Environmental Health Officers on issues such as the use of 
the ‘vac packing machine’, for example, he claimed that it was away for repair. 
Deficiencies in food safety practices existed for a long time prior to the Outbreak. 
    The inspections undertaken by the Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) from the 
Bridgend County Borough Council were made less effective due to William Tudor’s 
dishonesty. The inspections failed to monitor the business’s management of food 
safety. Important clues were missed and those that we identified were lost in the 
system as there was no method of alerting other Environmental Health Officers to 
the issues (this was important as there were frequent changes in the environmental 
health officers who visited the sites). Failures in the HACCP plan were very 
important and should have been picked up on. The Bridgend County Borough 
Council was last audited by the FSA in February 2004. The draft of the final report 
was not provided to the council until 17th June 2005, although a feedback was given 
at the end of the audit. Since the audit was system-based, it did not evaluate the 
quality of the inspections, but only whether or not there were systems in place to 
check methods. 
    John Tudor & Son supplied the schools under contract with Rhondda Cynof Taf, 
Bridgend, Caerphilly and Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Councils. The process by 
which these contracts were awarded in 1998 and 2002 contained major flaws. The 
details in the contract, roles and responsibilities between the organisations and key 
individuals, were not clear. Neither was the contracts monitored properly nor were 
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complaints properly recorded. A threat to securing a contract would have motivated 
John Tudor & Son to maintain good food safety practices. 
    Since the J.E. Tudor and Sons abattoir neither enforced nor followed the Meat 
Hygiene Regulations, contamination of the meat products manufactured by them 
was inevitable. The Meat Hygiene Service also failed to carry out its duties properly 
as the abattoir was allowed to function despite a continuous breach of the legislative 
requirements. A ‘light touch’ (Pennington et al., 2009, p.14) approach was adopted; 
this meant that businesses were not closed down in order to promote the meat 
industry. The reason for adopting this approach was to promote the meat industry in 
the UK. This might be construed as a flaw and a bias in food safety policy in the 
European Union (Ansell and Vogel, 2006). This proved to be too costly especially 
with regard to the Tudor & Son business. Although the hygiene problems at the 
abattoir were picked up on, they were allowed to carry on functioning without the 
need for significant improvements. This caused a substantial increase in the risk of 
E.coli O157 contaminated meat coming out of the abattoir, which caused an increase 
in the risk of unsafe food being produced and supplied into the food chain. This led 
to the Outbreak. 
    The OCT identified the common link between the cases at a very early stage and 
then reacted quickly to remove the cooked meats from the food chain. The efficiency 
of their work helped limit the spread of the Outbreak. They put in considerable time 
and effort to tackle the Outbreak, and also put in extra hours and out-of-hours 
working. In-patient hospital care was as effective as could be. At the earlier stages, 
there were some communication difficulties as there was no robust system for 
contacting Local Health Boards out-of-hours. However this did not have any adverse 
effects with regard to the outbreak control. This outbreak exposed the weaknesses in 
communication on a serious public health issue, which does not just limit to this 
E.coli O157 case. The only two systems that worked well were Treatment and Care 
and Outbreak Control. 
    W. Tudor and Sons disregarded food safety and the health of all the people who 
consumed meat products produced and distributed by his business. He pleaded 
guilty to seven offenses and was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment and 
banned from managing food business in the future.  
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Table 4 about here 
4. Findings 
4.1. 1996 E.coli O157 Outbreak analysis 
    The Accimap diagram resulting from the analysis is presented in Figure 2. The 
proximal events leading up to the outbreak are described in Table 3. These events, 
e.g. the charging of Mr John Barr with culpable and reckless conduct arising from the 
alleged supply of cooked meats on 10th January 1997, acted as reference points to 
begin analysis at the workplace system level as well as the physical/individual events 
and conditions level. 
    Although the Outbreak was labelled as an E.coli O157 outbreak, the systems 
analysis carried out showed that an accumulation of various other precursor factors 
led to the food poisoning outbreak in 1996. These causal factors were included in the 
analysis diagram under to show the gradual deterioration and failures at various 
levels throughout the system. These factors were also assimilated in order to 
analyse the individual factors, factors within a system and interactions between 
factors throughout the whole system.  
     The focus of the diagram was on two important factors: (1) lack of adequate 
regulations and (2) lack of regard for food hygiene by the business. It reveals the fact 
that the outbreak was not caused by individual errors at levels 4 or 5, but attributable 
to an accumulation of major factors right from level 2 such as lack of adequate 
resources for Environmental Health Officers and legislation for butchers’ shops. Five 
direct causes, two indirect causes and two pre-conditions were identified in level 2 of 
the analysis. The number of causes at level 2 (government level) are lesser than the 
number of causes in level 3 (organisational/workplace level). However, most of the 
causes in levels 3 and 4, and a lot of the final outcomes in level 5 arose due to the 
causes in level 2.  
    At the government level, most of the factors were related to inadequate 
regulations such as presence of loopholes in the Codes of Recommended Practices 
and Guidance, no mandatory requirement for food businesses to have a HACCP 
based system in place and the absence of legal authority to Meat Hygiene Services 
over transportation to non-registered premises. Factors related to the Environmental 
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Health Officers included inadequate number of EHOs, high work pressure, lack of 
adequate resources, EHOs being involved in other areas such a regulating noise 
and air pollution and few food safety trained managers. These factors led to a lack of 
motivation and poor morale in the Environmental Health Officers (EHOs). Only a few 
factors had a role to play at the external level. These included inadequate media 
awareness and commercial pressures. As it was expensive to carry out regular 
media awareness campaigns, this form of communication was seldom used. 
Commercial pressures were in the form of high demand from consumers and 
business owners. As this business distributed to a large number of consumers, Mr 
John Barr pressurised the environmental health officers to approve of the systems in 
place. 
    A large number of factors led to the E.coli O157 outbreak. The factors that were 
directly linked to the outbreak were mostly either due to human errors at the 
workplace level, or individual and physical events and conditions. The analysis 
highlighted the importance of regulations for butchers’ shops as without these, the 
businesses took advantage of the absence of regulatory measures and disregarded 
hygiene practices and food safety protocols. According to the European Union (EU) 
food law in 1996, a food business was responsible for ensuring the safety and 
protection of the consumer. The EU food hygiene legislation also required food 
businesses to undertake “own checks” (The Pennington Group, 1997) based on 
some of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) principles; however, 
implementation of all the HACCP principles was not a legal requirement. The 
inconsistency in requirements among the vertical (product specific regulations that 
deal with requirements for dealing with the product throughout the production 
process) and horizontal (covers a wide range of premises) regulations combined with 
the inadequate regulations led to confusion within the food business. Absence of a 
documented system was the major problem at the organisational and workplace 
level. Due to this, the distribution chain could not be traced and possible hazards 
were not analysed. External factors such as commercial pressures put the OVSs 
under pressure to lower their evaluation standards and pass unhygienic cattle for 
slaughter. Since E.coli O157 does not show symptoms in animals, it added in extra 
complexity as it could neither be tackled at the government level, nor at the 
workplace level and hence is shared between both. Other factors at the workplace 
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level included food being prepared at non-registered premises such as church halls 
and community centres and expenses to carry out microbiological testing. At the 
physical and individual events level, factors such as faulty layout and design of the 
plant, poorly planned equipment design, no separation of raw and cooked meats, 
presence of untrained helpers at the church hall and community centre events and 
faulty temperature monitoring and controlling systems played an important role in the 
1996 E.coli O157 Outbreak. The causes in level 4, similar to level 3, were mainly due 
to lack of adequate regulations and led to the outcomes in level 5. Level 5 in the 
diagram shows all the outcomes which were caused either directly or indirectly by 
the factors in the other levels.  
 
Figure 2 and Table 5 about here 
 
4.2. 2005 E.coli O157 Outbreak analysis 
    The Accimap diagram resulting from the analysis is presented in Figure 3. The 
proximal events leading up to the outbreak are described in Table 4. These events, 
e.g. the death of Mason Jones due to infection caused by E.coli O157 on 4th October 
2005, acted as reference points to begin analysis at the workplace system level as 
well as the physical/individual events and conditions level. 
    Similar to the1996 Outbreak this outbreak too was labelled as an E.coli O157 
outbreak. However the systems analysis carried out showed that an accumulation of 
various other precursor factors led to the food poisoning outbreak in 2005. The 
Accimap highlights the interactions between factors both, within and between the 
four levels, which led to the outbreak in 2005. These factors were also assimilated in 
order to analyse the individual factors, factors within a system and interactions 
between factors throughout the whole system.  
    The focus of the diagram was on two important factors: (1) faults in the 
government’s approach and (2) lack of regard for food hygiene regulations by the 
business. From Figure 3, it can be seen that all the factors across the various levels 
are interconnected in a complex manner. At the government level, although detailed 
regulations were present, factors such as faulty auditing, lowering of the annual 
budget, the ‘light touch’ approach (Pennington et al., 2009, p.14) and inadequate 
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services provided to the council were events that led to the outbreak. Most of the 
factors at the local council level were outcomes of the factors in level 1. Faults such 
as environmental health officers not being adequately trained in HACCP, lack of 
communication with employees, reduction in the number of EHOs, use of 
consultants and overdue inspections highlight the fact that at the local council level, 
all the factors were related to the Environmental Health Officers in some way or 
another. 
    Level 3 (organisational/workplace level) is divided into two sections: (1) 
management and (2) cleaning/premises in order to clearly define the factors. The 
management section comprises of all the errors made by the management at Tudor 
& Sons. The aim of this section is to highlight the disregard for food hygiene 
regulations by the management team at Tudor & Sons. This is the maximum number 
of causes when compared across all the levels indicating that the maximum number 
of human errors that led to this outbreak were at the management level. The latter 
section comprises of errors made with regard to cleaning of equipment and clothing 
at the workplace level. In this sub-level, lack of supervision by the management led 
to lack of regard for hygiene practices, which in-turn led to most of the other factors 
such as use of wrong soaps for cleaning, not washing their boots and clothes 
regularly, absence of a cleaning protocol and inadequate cleaning equipment. This 
factor was the consequence of errors made by the Environmental Health Officers at 
the local council level. This single link is an example of the interconnected nature of 
this outbreak. Level 4 highlights the physical and individual errors such as no regard 
for personal hygiene and no change of clothes while moving between the raw and 
cooked meat areas of the factory. Similar to section 4.1, Level 5 in the diagram 
shows all the outcomes which were caused either directly or indirectly by the factors 
in the other levels. 
 
Figure 3 and Table 6 about here 
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5. Discussion - comparing the outbreaks 
In order to compare the two outbreaks, we focus in this section on contributory 
factors which were ‘external’ to the outbreak (‘macro factors – e.g., related to 
regulation and government of food safety) and ‘internal factors’ (‘micro’ factors – e.g., 
organisational and workplace levels of analysis). A final section examines some of 
the interactions between these external (macro) and internal (micro levels of 
analysis). 
 5.1 External factors (‘macro’): regulation and government of food safety 
As seen from Figure 4, at the government/local council level the common factors 
were (1) complacency in food safety (2) inadequate support provided to EHOs and 
(3) provincial budget cuts. Examples of complacency in food safetyinclude (a) 
absence of implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) in 
the 1996 Outbreak (as a consequence of this, industries did not have any 
documented system in place whereby their processing methods, hygiene standards 
and supply chains could be traced), (b) loopholes in the Codes of Recommended 
Practices and Guidance which allowed exemption from 1994 Regulations (food 
industries had the ability to find a way around the need to maintain hygiene 
standards. In the 2005 Outbreak, the Tudor business was not inspected before 
awarding them a contract to serve schools), (c) faulty audits, (d) use of a ‘light touch’ 
approach (the abattoir was allowed to function despite clear breach of regulations) 
and (e) authorities not having a defined role highlight the slapdash approach adopted 
at the government level. 
    Provincial budget cuts meant reduced budgets for Environmental Health Officers 
indicating that this department was not considered to be as important as other 
branches in the local council. As a result of reduced funding, the department could 
hire only a limited number of environmental health officers. This added to the work 
load on the EHOs who were already dealing with environment and housing safety as 
well as food safety issues. Similarly, HACCP training could not be provided to all the 
senior managers. As quite a few of the senior managers were not trained in HACCP, 
they had no clue about HACCP and its importance and hence were not competent 
enough to deal with food safety related matters. In the 1996 Outbreak, the 1995 
Regulations that were in place were too complicated and were not as prescriptive; 
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this led to widespread confusion at the workplace level. This, in combination with the 
presence of loopholes such as Codes of Recommended Practices and Guidance led 
to the rise of other factors at the organisational/workplace level. Risks that can arise 
during transport had been underestimated at the local council level. The fact that 
there was no legal requirement to implement the directives and the presence of 
mixed transportation standards gave the food business a free hand in the transport 
conditions. This demonstrates that until the 1996 Outbreak occurred, the government 
underestimated the importance of a detailed regulation. These flaws were rectified 
as per the recommendations by The Pennington Group Report (1997). 
 
5.2 Internal (‘Micro’) factors: organisational and workplace levels of analysis 
    In both the outbreaks, meat, which is a high risk food with regard to the number of 
microorganisms in it (Al-holy and Rasco, 2015; Paik, Lee et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 
2015) was served to highly vulnerable populations; to the elderly population in the 
1996 Outbreak and school children in the 2005 Outbreak without proper processing 
(Pennington et al., 2009; The Pennington Group, 1997). The vulnerability of the 
population determined the scale of the outbreak as the chances of being affected by 
pathogens was higher due to weaker immunity. Unlike the comparison between 
Walkerton and North Battleford cases by Woo and Vicente (2003), there are both 
common as well as unique factors between the outbreaks in Scotland and South 
Wales.  Figure 4 illustrates the common factors between both the outbreaks. At the 
organisational/workplace level compliancy failures was the common causal factor. 
There was neither any proper documented system in place nor any regard for 
hygiene and food safety. Although in 1996 there was no regulation making it 
mandatory to have a HACCP based system in place, there were legal requirements 
to conduct a hazard analysis. Blatant disregard for hygiene and food safety was a 
common factor in both the food businesses. Due to Tudor’s intimidating nature (2005 
Outbreak) and a reduction in number of EHOs the Official Veterinary Surgeons 
(OVSs) were under pressure to approve all the cattle they had to evaluate. It is 
highly likely that under pressure the OVSs could have also made additional 
unintentional mistakes. Due to this pressure, the OVSs also did not have a 
consistent approach while carrying out their evaluations.  
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    From a system designer’s point of view, some of the factors across the systemic 
levels are very difficult to anticipate while designing equipment or buildings to protect 
public health. The nature of these factors makes it difficult to identify a systematic 
approach to the management of risk in complex socio-technical systems (Woo and 
Vicente, 2003). In order to do so one would have to undertake a comprehensive 
study of the culture in food businesses to identify various possible issues (similar and 
unique). Although the basic outline for safety and hygiene is the same, due to 
cultural differences the business culture would vary from country to country. For 
example, the food business operational culture in the UK would be different from that 
in Saudi Arabia. If the targets are variable, how can there be an orderly remedy? 
(Woo and Vicente, 2003). 
    As Figure 4 in this study contradicts Figure 6 in the study carried out by Woo and 
Vicente (2003), it would be inaccurate to conclude that common factors tend to be 
present at higher systemic levels. However by comparing various accidents across 
multiple sectors (nuclear, gas, rail and hospital) and within the same sector (food), it 
would be unerring to point out that there are factors which are specific to certain 
systemic levels. Figure 4 also highlights a range of factors across various systemic 
levels that led to similar outbreaks even after nine years.  On comparing Figures 2, 3 
and 4, it can be seen that although there were few unique causal factors related to 
each outbreak, when looked at on the whole most of the factors that led to the 1996 
and 2005 outbreaks were similar (for e.g. cross contamination, lack of training, 
erroneous approach by food business operators and food businesses). As 
compliancy failures were a common factor in both the Outbreaks, an approach must 
be designed such that it addresses complacency and compliancy failures across 
every level in the food industry. In 2003, Woo and Vicente compared the work done 
by Hrudey et al. and Rasmussen’s framework and deduced that the only way to 
address these systemic failures would be by identifying the possible threats at each 
level and finding possible solutions.  
 
5.3 Interactions between internal (‘macro’) and external (‘micro’) levels of analysis 
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    In both the cases there was interaction between complex human beings, complex 
organisations and complex machines (Sagan, 1995). Conflicting interests is one of 
the common causal factors across both the accidents. Complex organisations find it 
hard to manage hazardous technologies and processes due to the inevitable 
presence of conflicting priorities (Sagan, 1995). As both Barr and Tudor prioritized 
maximum production and profits over hygiene and food safety, even employees who 
wanted to ensure good manufacturing practices were not able to do so due to 
conflicting interests and hierarchy; ambiguous preferences led to a state of uneasy 
tension. According to Sagan (1995), safety is reduced when leaders themselves do 
not have strong incentives to improve safety. In both the 1996 and the 2005 
outbreaks, carelessness was a common micro as well as macro factor. 
Environmental Health Officers failed to report or detect faulty activities at either of the 
businesses; due to budget cuts, the number of EHOs was also reduced greatly and 
there were frequent changes in managers. This led to confusion while checking 
records. At the organisational level, carelessness was rampant among management 
as well as staff working on the floor. Repeatedly ignoring hygiene practices in order 
to maximise profits and intimidating employees played a major role in leading to 
these outbreaks. 
    Constraints on learning was another common causal factor in both the outbreaks. 
In his book “The Limits of Safety” (1995), Sagan states that political factors are 
usually the root of most other causal factors. Organisations do not have simple, 
consistent preferences; instead they exhibit internal conflict over preferences. These 
conflicts lead to a shift from problem solving to the rise of political factors. Factors 
such as strong disincentives against reporting or noting failures existed in both the 
businesses. This influenced the reporting of near-misses by workers, stress-levels 
and the belief of what is acceptable to record, which in-turn affected the 
interpretation of events by the authorities. Unofficially there were two sets of 
behaviours in the businesses, “back-stage behaviour” and “front-stage behaviour”. 
Front-stage behaviour includes inaccurate records of behaviours and actions; these 
were actions that should have ideally been carried out in a food business. Back-
stage behaviour consists of the actual behaviours and actions that were carried out 
in both the businesses (e.g. attitudes of the food businesses operators towards food 
safety and hygiene, deviation from regulations, etc.).  
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    All businesses have powerful individuals inside the organisations who try to 
manipulate behaviour and change the business’ goals. Both Tudor as well as Barr 
manipulated hygiene practices and forced the workers to manipulate records; 
however Sagan (1995) also states that as things are never as they seem, the 
managers or workers should not ignore a near-miss accident only because they 
have been told to do so. In both the 1996 as well as the 2005 outbreaks, the 
managers and workers also ignored hygiene practices only because they were told 
to do so. Food businesses are complex organisational systems that manage 
hazardous technologies; serious accidents in such systems are inevitable according 
to the normal accidents theory (Sagan, 1995). As organisations are “natural open 
systems” (Sagan, 1995), they pursue their own goals such as company security and 
survival and mostly focus on production, reliability and generating profits. The 
garbage can model proposed by March, Cohen and Olsen states that complex 
organisations make radically different decisions compared to the ones that fall under 
the rational models (Sagan, 1995). From both the outbreak reports it can be seen 
that Tudor’s as well as Barr’s business had ill-defined preferences where different 
individuals at different levels of the organisation had different preferences. This led to 
confusion in the organisations as processes were not understood by its own 
employees. One of  the main reason for this ignorance is that the organisations 
involved did not fathom the consequences of their actions. 
     
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
6.  Conclusions, future work and study limitations 
    Systemic analyses of both the outbreaks suggest that the food industry is a 
complex socio-technical system consisting of various systemic levels. Currently the 
focus within the food industry is on microbiological analyses. This will only help solve 
the problems at a very late stage in the food manufacturing process. In order to 
address food safety related issues it is important that we look at the food industry as 
a whole and aim to identify and solve problems that could arise at each of the 
systemic levels. These ‘problems’ usually arise during the incubation phase of a 
disaster – that is, the period prior to the disaster during which certain organisational 
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processes and factors allow a disaster to occur; these factors accumulate unnoticed 
(Ali, 2004). As seen from this study, both the outbreaks had common as well as 
unique factors. Similarly, food poisoning outbreaks occurring in any part of the world 
also have common factors associated to them as seen in various other outbreaks 
such as the 2009 Godstone Farm E.coli O157, the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy case between 1986 and 1996 and the Walkerton E.coli Outbreak in 
Canada among many others (Cassano-Piché et al., 2006; Clayton and Griffith, 2008; 
Griffin et al., 2010; Griffith et al., 2010; May, 2010; Nayak and Waterson, 2015; 
Pennington, 2003). The study also suggests that the use of a systems approach to 
analyse the human and organisational issues involved in outbreaks is a practical 
method as it helps to identify multiple key causal factors, gain an in-depth insight into 
the functioning of the food industry and identify faults (if any). Normal accident 
theorists believe that a strong organisational culture (intense socialization, strict 
discipline and isolation from the problems of broader society) is needed to reduce 
the number of accidents; however what needs to be assessed is whether due to the 
strict “military model” (Sagan, 1995), achieving these targets is plausible as it is 
impossible to maintain strict discipline and to ensure isolation from the problems of 
broader society in a non-militiary organisation (Sagan, 1995). 
    Future research should assess whether the findings of this analysis is 
generalizable across a broader set of cases within the food industry sector. In order 
to do so it would be important to assess the safety culture in food industries as this 
would help better understand the vertical integration in businesses. The lesson from 
other industries is that safety culture is often difficult to assess. The definition of safe 
behaviour is a matter of interpretation; hence the extent of compliance by industries 
to ensure food safety and hygiene would vary as long as there is no universal 
protocol. The variation would depend on the organisational role and professional 
background (e.g. management and workers attitude towards good hygiene practices). 
It is important to understand the relationship between poor food safety culture, lack 
of motivation amongst employees and management and a poor morale amongst 
environmental health officers due to budget cutbacks. The effects of budget cutbacks 
can be seen in the report by Thompson and Garrett-Peltier (2012); they state that the 
Ryan budget plan, named after the principal author of the bill (Chariman Paul Ryan), 
which proposed a $127 billion cut, would lead to a loss of more than 174,000 jobs in 
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one year; each $1 billion cut would eliminate 13,718 jobs. The Ryan budget plan was 
a Republican budget plan drawn for the 2014 elections in the United States of 
America. The report by Hastings et al. (2015) states that the most deprived 
authorities in England have a level of budget cut nearly six times higher than the cut 
experienced in the least deprived areas. These austerity measures have led to the 
authorities working with scarce resources, and this in turn has led to a strain on basic 
services. Applying this to the UK context and to the outbreaks analysed in this paper, 
the budget cutbacks in the food safety industry led to loss of jobs for a few 
Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) while the ones who retained their jobs were 
burdened with too many tasks as they had to assess the same number of 
businesses with reduced man-power. We note in passing that similar cuts to EHO 
numbers are likely to have an impact on present day food safety. Hence these three 
factors lead to lack of compliance and affect the safety culture in food businesses. A 
better understanding of the attitudes of employees and management in the food 
industry is needed alongside an audit of tools used to assess food hygiene and 
safety. It is important to understand that human-induced stresses induce effects that 
reverberate throughout the whole system (Ali, 2004) which lead to accidents. 
    A major limitation of the approach used is that in retrospect, all events that led to 
the outbreaks seem to be very clear; hence there is a retrospective bias in this kind 
of analysis. Hindsight bias, which is the tendency to exaggerate the a priory 
predictability of outcomes after they have become known (Fessel et al., 2009), is a 
major limitation for this study as predictive judgements could be distorted by 
knowledge of the outcomes of the events predicted. Once events have occurred they 
have higher postdictive than predictive probabilities; this means that once an event is 
reported, its perceived inevitability increases significantly (Fischhoff and Beyth, 
1975). However according to Mazursky and Ofir (1990), if analyses of past events 
are not carried out, unexpected events are meted out by exaggerated adjustment in 
a direction opposite to hindsight bias. In other words, in order to explain unexpected 
events, people tend to “recall significantly lower expectations” (Mazursky and Ofir, 
1990) and hence these forms of analyses are essential. Systems analyses of the 
type we have described in this paper are also needed.  
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Table 1: Key functions of Environmental Health Officers in the UK (Food Standards 
Agency, 2010) 
 
Functions Details 
Interventions at food establishments Compliance with new and improved 
legislation and any new central 
government initiatives. 
Maintaining the establishment’s profile, 
number of interventions planned, number 
of revisits to be made and an estimation of 
resources required. 
Dealing with food complaints Investigation of food complaints and 
keeping an account of the business 
complained about. 
Food sampling According to regulations, it is mandatory 
for EHOs to estimate the number of 
samples that will be taken from an 
establishment and carry out sampling. 
Food safety incidents In the event of there being a food safety 
related incident, it is the Environmental 
Health Officer’s duty to comply with the 
relevant Codes of Practice, estimate the 
services and resources required. 
Providing advice to businesses After carrying out an inspection, it is the 
EHO’s duty to advice the business on any 
required changes or answering any 
queries, should the food business have 
any. 
Control and investigation of food related 
infectious disease 
Investigation of food poisoning incidents 
and outbreak control; estimation of 
previous years’ trends and resources 
required. 
Liaison with other organisations The authorities must ensure that the steps 
they use to carry out inspections and the 
enforcement actions they have taken is 
consistent with those of neighbouring local 
authorities. 
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Table 2: Steps used to construct the Accimap (Branford et al., 2009) 
Step number Details 
1 Sections were made on a large sheet of 
paper, with the headings of the various levels 
on the left-hand side 
2 Each accident was analysed separately and 
negative outcomes to be analysed were 
identified. The outcomes were now inserted 
into the “Outcomes” level of the Accimap  
3 A list of the causal factors was made. Causal 
factors are factors which if prevented, would 
probably have avoided the accident 
4 The appropriate level for each of the causal 
factors was identified based on the 
guidelines provided in Table 1 by Branford et 
al. (2009) 
5 The causal factors were written on a sticky 
note and then placed at the appropriate level 
on the sheet of paper 
6 The causal links were inserted, linking the 
factors and hence demonstrating the 
systemic errors 
7 Using Microsoft Visio, the factors were 
rearranged such that that related and causes 
leading to the same outcome(s) were placed 
close to each other, whether in the same 
level or in the level(s) below 
Reviewed by Rounaq Nayak and Patrick Waterson as mentioned in Section 2.2.  
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Table 3: The proximal events leading to the E.coli O157 outbreak in the Central 
belt Scotland in 1996 (The Pennington Group, 1997) 
Adapted from The Pennington Group Report, 1997. 
Date Event(s) 
17 November 1996 People infected at a luncheon served at 
Wishaw Old Parish Church. 
22 November 1996 Possibility of an outbreak of food poisoning 
due to E.coli O157 identified. 
 
23 November 1996 Outbreak control team (OCT) formed by The 
Scottish Office Department of Health 
Advisory Group on Infection. 
 
26 November 1996 The Scottish Office Department of Health 
(SODoH) and the Agriculture, Environment 
and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) met 
with the Health Board and the Council. 
27 November 1996 Food Hazard Warning issued by the Scottish 
Office. 
 
28 November 1996 Detailed advice and guidelines for butchers 
was issued by The Scottish Office through a 
further Food Hazard Warning. 
The Scottish Office attended the OCT 
meetings as observers. 
The Secretary of State for Scotland 
announced in Parliament the establishment 
of an Expert Group to “examine the 
circumstances which led to the outbreak in 
the central belt of Scotland and to advice on 
the implications for food safety and the 
general lessons to be learned. This group 
was to be chaired by Professor Hugh 
Pennington. 
5 December 1996 The Crown Office announced that a Fatal 
Accident Inquiry (FAI) would be held into the 
deaths due to the outbreak. 
10 January 1997 Mr John Barr charged with culpable and 
reckless conduct arising from the alleged 
supply of cooked meats. 
April 1997 The report on the circumstances leading to 
the 1996 outbreak of infection with E.coli 
O157 in Central Scotland, the implications 
for food safety and the lessons to be learned 
published. 
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Table 4: The proximal events leading to the E.coli O157 outbreak in South Wales in 
2005 
Adapted from The Public Inquiry into the September 2005 Outbreak of E.coli O157 in South Wales, 2009. 
Date Event(s) 
1998 - 2005 Contract awarded to John Tudor & Son to 
provide meat. 
2001 New line manager. 
1 September 2003 New Principal and Senior Environmental 
Health Officers appointed. 
Late 2003 New Procedures policy introduced by 
Bridgend council. 
February 2004 Bridgend County Borough Council audited by 
the Food Standards Agency (FSA). 
16 August 2004 New Enforcement Policy introduced by 
Bridgend council. 
17 June 2005 Draft report provided by FSA to the Bridgend 
County Borough Council. 
August 2005 Senior EHO leaves post. 
10 September 2005 Possible start date of 3 possible cases. 
16 September 2005 The admission of five children with watery, 
blood-stained diarrhoea is reported by a 
doctor at Prince Charles Hospital, Merthyr 
Tydfil to the National Public Health Service 
for Wales. 
Outbreak declared. 
Outbreak Control Team (OCT) formed. 
 
4 October 2005 Mason Jones succumbs to infection due to 
E.coli O157. 
5 October 2005 The National Assembly for Wales sets up a 
cross-party committee to consider the terms 
of reference for a public inquiry. 
7 November 2005 Last date of registered case. 
17 November 2005 Professor Hugh Pennington joins the 
committee as the Chair. 
 
14 December 2005 An investigator from the Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency visited The Farm to 
collect samples of bovine faeces and 
bedding contaminated with bovine faeces. 
20 December 2005 Outbreak formally declared over. 
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Date Event(s) 
13 March 2006 The Inquiry’s formal start date. 
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Table 5: Explanation of the numbered factors in Figure 3 
Factor Identification Number Interpretation 
1 It was too expensive to carry out a media awareness program and 
hence using this medium to inform the people was not a long term 
option. 
2 The 1995 Regulations addressed only the concepts of HACCP and 
were less detailed in comparison to the 1994 Regulations. 
3 The loopholes allowed small businesses exemption from certain parts of 
the 1994 Regulations and there was no direct legal requirement to 
implement the directives. 
4 The Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) did not have any legal authority over 
transportation of meat to non-registered premises. 
5 In addition to there being no resources earmarked for either food safety 
or environmental health purposes, educating food handlers in HACCP 
principles heavily depleted the EHOs resources. 
6 Out of 600 qualified environmental health officers in Scotland, only 15 
from Glasgow, 7 from Edinburgh and 3 from Moray were in food safety 
full time. Other EHOs were also tasked with other duties such as 
evaluating noise and air pollution, health and safety and housing. 
7 In the 1970s there was a merger in the government departments; hence 
although not all senior managers were trained in food safety, they were 
still put in charge of this department. 
8 Less than 50% of the butchers had a product recall system in place; 
only 11% had tested their recall system. 
9 Poorly planned design and layout restricted the effective flow of meat 
and also led to the carcasses coming in contact with walls and floors. 
10 There were three stages of cross contamination: (1) animal-animal, (2) 
animal-human and (3) human-human. 
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11 The outbreak was declared on 22nd November 1996 and the number of 
cases increased by 24th November. In total there were 496 cases and 18 
people died. 
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Table 6: Explanation of the numbered factors in Figure 4 
Factor Identification Number Interpretation 
1 As the auditing system was strictly systems based, quality of the 
inspections carried was not evaluated. 
2 At the government level as the only target was to overcome legal 
barriers, the tender documents were not handed over to the 
Environmental Health Department for re-verification. 
3 Although the audit was carried out in February 2004, the draft report 
wasn't sent to the local council for over a year (17th June 2005). 
4 There were multiple faulty approaches taken by the EHOs such as: (1) 
no system for red-flagging from previous visits, (2) not communicating 
with employees during visits, (3) overdue inspections, (5) no verification 
of records shown by Tudors and (6) lenient rating. 
5 There was no written document that stated the role of each of the 4 
authorities (Rhondda Cynon Taf, Bridgend, Caerphilly and Merthyr 
Tydfil County Borough Councils). 
6 Meath Hygiene Regulations were neither enforced nor followed and the 
OVS disregarded regulations set by the Parliament and breached 
protocol by not inspecting every carcass post-mortem. 
7 The HACCP plan was misleading and inaccurate and the EHOs were 
constantly lied to. 
8 Single machinery was used for all cleaning all meats (raw and cooked) 
and all types of meat were handled at the vacuum packing machine and 
weighing scales. 
9 Fresh and stale meat was mixed repeatedly for 4 years. 
10 Although there were a separate set of clothes available while moving 
between raw and cooked meat processing areas, the workers did not 
change their clothes. 
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Figure 1: Accimap diagram format  
 
Adapted from Svedung and Rasmussen (2002). 
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Figure 2 – Accimap diagram of the 1996 E.coli O157 Outbreak 
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Figure 3 – Accimap diagram of the 2005 E.coli O157 Outbreak
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Figure 4 – Comparative analysis of the Scotland and South Wales outbreaks 
summarizing the factors that were common to both the accidents –  
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Appendix 1 
 
Acronyms used in the article 
 
Acronym Full form 
EHO(s) Environmental Health Officer(s) 
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point(s) 
RSPH Royal Society for Public Health 
OCT Outbreak Control Team 
FSA Food Standards Agency 
OVS(s) Official Veterinary Surgeon(s) 
MHS Meat Hygiene Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
                                            
1
 ‘Outbreak’ refers to either one of the outbreaks in particular and ‘outbreaks’ refers to either both the 
outbreaks or outbreaks in general. 
